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7 From Prediction to Imagination
Max Jones and Sam Wilkinson
There is an increasingly popular framework for thinking about what the brain is
fundamentally in the business of doing. We call this the predictive processing
framework (PPF), and it takes the brain to be a hierarchically arranged prediction
machine (Clark, 2013, 2016; Hohwy, 2013). In this chapter, we explore the con-
sequences that this framework has for our understanding of imagination. In other
words, we ask: “If you buy into this framework, what account of imagination should
you give?”
In one sense, the PPF can be seen to demystify the imagination. One of the
seemingly anomalous features of the imagination, from a naïve perspective, is its
capacity for endogenously and creatively generating content, for conjuring up
worlds in the mind. Yet, in the PPF approach, our basic worldly interactions through
perception and action are already essentially dependent on imagination-like gen-
erative processes. However, the PPF’s commitment to the ubiquity of imagination-
like processes in our more mundane worldly interactions may also give rise to
problems in identifying and explaining imagination as a distinct process in its own
right. In particular, the PPF may struggle to explain the distinctive imaginative
capacity for deliberately departing from immediate reality in a constrained and
purposeful manner.
We proceed as follows. We start by introducing the PPF (section 1: Introducing
the Predictive Processing Framework). Arguably, the PPF is most intuitively
appealing as an account of perception and perceptual cognition, but it has also
been extended to an understanding of action, through the notion of active infer-
ence. We then (in section 2: Predictive Processing and Imagination) present a first
attempt at accounting for imagination within the PPF in terms of perceptual
inference, which has been assumed by several theorists to be rather straightfor-
ward. We then (in section 3: Imaginative Agency and Imaginative Constraints)
argue that this first attempt faces problems in accounting for the purposeful and
constrained nature of deliberate imagination, which sets it aside from processes
like dreaming, hallucination, or mind-wandering. We then consider (in section 4:
Imagination as Mental Action) an alternative PPF account of imagination that
focuses more on active inference and takes imagination to be based on action
simulation. Although this account is more promising, it fails, on its own, to fully
account for more drastic imaginative departures from reality. With this in mind,
we gesture toward a possible way forward that focuses on the role of language in
cueing and shaping imagination.
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Introducing the Predictive Processing Framework (PPF)
The PPF is introduced and explained in a number of different ways by
different people (see Clark, 2013 for a classic formulation). Our favorite way is to
think about two things. The first is the ambiguity inherent in the information that we
get from the world (including, crucially, ourselves as part of that world). The second
is the efficiency with which the brain ought to operate.1 Let’s examine these two
things in turn.
Bayesian Resolution of Ambiguity
The world is a noisy and ambiguous place. For any system trying to make sense of
the world, which we can gloss roughly as trying to come up with hypotheses about
the world, there is always more than one hypothesis compatible with any given piece
of data. How, then, in the face of this ambiguity, does any such system pick
a hypothesis out of those with equally good fit? According to the PPF the answer
to this question is the same as the one that Thomas Bayes gave to it more than 250
years ago (Bayes, 1763): The system needs to use background knowledge, namely,
knowledge about the probabilities of each hypothesis independently of (prior to) the
evidence (the data). This is called the “prior probability,” or “prior” for short, and it
serves to bias hypothesis selection in the face of equal (or near-equal) fit.2
A consequence of this idea is that a hypothesis can be selected even though it has
relatively bad fit, as long as it has a high enough prior probability. Conversely,
a hypothesis with a relatively good fit might not be selected if its prior probability is
too low.
Let us illustrate this Bayesian story with an example (borrowed from Pezzulo,
2014). Suppose you are in a bedroom, and you hear a downstairs window creak. And
suppose for simplicity’s sake that two hypotheses present themselves: “That’s the
wind blowing the window” or “That’s a burglar climbing in through the window.”
Both have adequate fit in the sense that, if they were true, that is the sound that might
plausibly be produced. However, the probability of each hypothesis independently of
the squeak (viz. the prior probability) might be quite different. Suppose you know
that you live in a neighborhood with a very low crime rate, and you know that it’s
a windy night. That would give the wind hypothesis a higher prior probability, and
that is the hypothesis that ought to be selected.
At this point it is crucial to emphasize that this example involves a person (you)
dealing with experiential information (the window squeak) in a Bayesian manner.
The PPF intends this to apply to even the lowest levels of neural inference. To use
this same example, by the time that you have experienced the qualitative features of
1 By “efficiency” we mean an optimal trade-off between speed, accuracy, and energy expenditure. By
“ought to” we don’t mean anything robustly normative, but rather an expectation that evolutionary
pressures will lead to efficient systems.
2 Where these priors come from is theoretically up for grabs. What we know is that at least some are the
result of statistical learning from past experience (exposure to the world). Some might be innate in
some sense (whether what counts as innate is the priors themselves or the propensity to acquire certain
priors).
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a squeak (even prior to recognizing it as a window squeak) your nervous system has
already made countless earlier Bayesian inferences based on the raw (preconscious,
pre-experiential) sensory input.
Efficient Neural Implementation Through Predictive Processing
According to the PPF, this is the Bayesian strategy that the brain adopts in the face of
an ambiguous world. But how is it implemented in the brain? The answer here is: in
a way that is efficient, which is to say, both anticipatory and energy-saving. Given
that the human nervous system has a wealth of background knowledge that it brings
to bear on an ambiguous world, we can think of each encounter with the world as
already being anticipatory. As energy impacts on your sensory surfaces, it is already
being greeted by expectations on the part of the system. This, one might argue, is
simply a physiological extrapolation of the notion of Bayesian priors. It also paves
the way for a tremendously energy-saving information-processing strategy. To see
why, think about the fundamental principle underlying data compression. When
passing a message between a sender-receiver pair, you optimize bandwidth by
leaving out the message that the receiver can fill in for itself. This principle translates
to the human brain in that the relevant senders and receivers are parts of the cortical
hierarchy. In perceptual processing, say, visual processing, as light hits the retina, it is
already being greeted by expectations. But what gets passed up the processing chain?
The part of the signal that hasn’t already been predicted, namely, prediction error
(Feldman and Friston, 2010). What we end up with is a rich but hugely efficient and
proactive system in which only newsworthy aspects of the nervous system are
explicitly neurally represented. Furthermore, what you experience at any given
time is not primarily determined by sensory input, but rather by the hypothesis that
your brain has adopted to best predict (explain away/quash) that sensory input.
Two Tweaks: Hierarchy and Precision
We have in place the basic picture: the Bayesian strategy, and its neural implementa-
tion through prediction error minimization. However, there are two crucial tweaks to
this picture. The first is the notion of a hierarchy of predictive hypotheses;
the second, the notion of precision.
According to the PPF, predictive hypotheses are hierarchically organized, with
the hypotheses of one level feeding into the level below (and prediction error feeding
into the level above). “Higher” parts of the hierarchy are, roughly, those parts that are
further away from the sensory stimulus. These tend to be at slower temporal time-
scales, and a higher level of abstraction. At the very top they might correspond to
relatively stable beliefs. “Lower” parts of the hierarchy are closer to the sensory
stimulus. These tend to be at faster temporal frequencies, and at low levels of
abstraction (i.e. concrete and specific). These, for example, might correspond to
early stages of visual processing: your brain’s early statistically driven attempts to
make sense of noisy inputs. Of course, in order to express these neurally encoded
predictions we need to use rough-and-ready descriptions in natural language, but
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there is nothing linguistic about the priors/hypotheses (e.g. “light tends to come from
above” / “This is a face”) themselves.
Let us return to the case of the squeaking window. At the stage where those two
hypotheses (burglar vs. wind) are competing, a great deal of ambiguity has already
been resolved, in a Bayesian fashion, at lower levels of the hierarchy. For example, in
early stages of auditory processing, the qualities of the sound will have been settled
upon, giving rise to the conscious experience being a certain way, qualitatively
speaking. Higher up the hierarchy, that sound gets interpreted as a creaking window,
as opposed to, say, a screeching cat. The direction of causation is from the (events
represented in the) lower regions of the hierarchy, to the (events represented in the)
higher regions of the hierarchy. However, the direction of the Bayesian inference is
from the effects to the causes.
So much for hierarchy, now for precision. Although incoming signals are always
ambiguous, in different contexts the degree of ambiguity will differ. To maximize its
predictive success, the brain needs to accurately estimate how much ambiguity
(uncertainty) there will be. In other words, it needs to make second-order predictions,
namely, predictions about howmuch it should rely on its predictions (which amounts
to how much it should pay heed to the prediction-error).
In contexts where low ambiguity is expected (high signal-to-noise ratio), higher
precision will be demanded, and the prediction error will be taken more seriously.
Conversely, when there is high ambiguity (or, through some top-down influence,
there is no interest in the stimulus), low precision is demanded, and the prediction
error will be taken less seriously. This is called “precision weighting” (Hohwy,
2013), it amounts to adjusting “the gain” on prediction error, and is taken to be
modulated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine (Corlett et al., 2010).
It has been hypothesized that the turning up of precision is the mechanism that
underlies attentional focus. Take visual attention as an example. If you are attending
to a particular part of your visual field, you have turned the precision right up on your
perceptual hypothesis. The result is more precise and informationally rich, but also
(other things being equal) higher-risk in terms of error. Thankfully, in appropriate
contexts, say, good lighting conditions, you can afford to take that risk because the
environment is informationally reliable. If, however, you are walking through the
woods at dusk, excessive levels of precision-weighting might lead you to mistake
tree-stumps for lurking individuals.
The turning down of precision is also seen as equally important. It corresponds to
perceptual decoupling from the world; it allows your brain to hold on to hypotheses
that do not adequately predict the world (since the prediction error is down-
modulated to the point of being ignored). In the context of active inference, which
we are about to introduce now, the turning down of precision is central to the
inhibition of overt action.
From Perception to Action
So the main business of brains like ours, according to the PPF, is the minimization of
errors in the prediction of sensory inputs. However, the minimization of prediction
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error isn’t only achieved by the brain updating its predictions about the world (which
results in perception and belief), it is sometimes achieved by bringing the world,
usually the body, in line with the predictions (Clark, 2016: Chapter 4; Feldman and
Friston, 2010). The result of this is bodily action. To use a specific example, when
I see someone with their hand up, my brain has adopted the hypothesis that someone
has their hand up: My brain responds to the world. However, when I move to raise
my hand, my nervous system adopts the proprioceptive prediction that my hand is
raised. That prediction is then fulfilled by my subsequent hand-raising. Thus an
organism’s capacity for endogenous bodily movement is just another manifestation
of prediction error minimization. It just happens that the relevant prediction in the
case of action is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This distinction between the updating of the hypothesis to fit the world and the
updating of the world to fit the hypothesis amounts to the distinction between
perceptual inference and active inference. Although in theory these are two quite
distinct manifestations of the predictive processing apparatus, in practice organisms
are constantly doing a bit of both. For example, when you are looking through a rainy
windscreen, you might perform exploratory movements from side to side to see what
is beyond the droplet-covered glass. Here your nervous system is effortlessly tog-
gling between active and perceptual inference to generate an optimal hypothesis of
what’s in the world, including the intricate subtleties of your place in it. The central
mechanism behind this toggling is precision. Precision is down-modulated during
the formation of the proprioceptive prediction (the functional equivalent of what in
more classical architectures is known as the motor command), otherwise it couldn’t
be formed at all (since it would be immediately updated to fit the world) and then
increased in such a way as to bring the body in line with it.
Predictive Processing and Imagination
How does the PPF accommodate imagination? What is going on in our
predictive brains when we imagine something? Here we go through a number of
options.
Imagination as the Fundamental Building Block of Experience
Several theorists have taken this to be rather unproblematic, seeing the PPF as
especially suited to accounting for imagination. For example, Andy Clark states
that the PPF “means that perception (at least, as it occurs in creatures like us), is co-
emergent with (something quite like) imagination” (Clark, 2015: 26). And as
Michael Kirchhoff (Kirchhoff, 2018: 752) puts it, there is a “deep unity” in the
idea, central to the PPF, that “perception and imagination are the psychological
results of the brain generating its own sensory inputs top-down.” This notion of the
“brain generating its own input top-down,” though striking, is perhaps a little mis-
leading, at least insofar as it holds on to the idea that what we experience, our
phenomenology, at a given time is determined or constituted by “input.” A more
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complete embracing of the PPF and an understanding of how radically it departs
from predominantly bottom-up views leaves us with the notion that our phenomen-
ology at any given time is not determined – still less constituted by – an input
(whether self-generated or not) that predates (even fractionally) the experience.
Instead, the story goes, it is a forward-looking projection, leaving the role of input
as one of correction and constraint: The difference between the imagining mind (or
indeed the hallucinating mind) and the perceiving mind is much less great than in
standard views, since the role of in-the-moment environmental information is much
smaller. What is needed in order to take cognition offline, to break the link with the
world, is to turn down the precision in a way that makes model-building (often
deliberately, in the case of imagination, and accidentally in the case of hallucination)
unconstrained by, and unresponsive to, sensory input.
In a sense, this amounts to a revisionist metaphysics of perceptual experience.
Contrary to what we might think, perception actually involves imagination. On this
view, the oft-cited dictum that “perception is controlled hallucination” is almost
right. But the word “hallucination” already implies that there is no correspondence to
reality.What works better is: “Perception is constrained imagination.”Hallucination,
on the other hand, is imagination unconstrained by sensory input. This construes
imagination as a fundamental building block of PPF: the raw material of all experi-
ence, whether offline or online.
Imagination as (a Subspecies of) Offline Cognition
This interpretation of the relationship between the PPF and imagination effectively
equates the mind’s selected predictive hypothesis (which determines the experience
at any given time) with imagination. On this view, any conscious experience –
perception, hallucination, dreaming etc. – involves imagination. But one might
argue that this seems like an unorthodox terminological stipulation, and an unhelpful
one at that. Isn’t it more apt to say that the online version of this should be called
perception and the offline version (or a subset thereof at least) called imagination? If
this is indeed the case, one might think (pace Clark) that there is no reason that they
would co-emerge. Indeed, one might think that the ability to decouple from the
sensory flow is a later achievement, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically
(Pezzulo, 2011; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009). In contrast to the idea that
imagination is basic, perception would, in this view, emerge long before imagination,
and it is the latter that reuses the resources used for the former and not the other way
around.
To put this another way, while our experience at any given time is determined by
the multilevel predictive model that our brains have selected, sometimes this is in
order to make sense of imminent sensory input, and what we are talking about in this
case is online cognition, which gives rise to perceptual experience. At other times,
the story goes, the link to the outside world is broken. This would be achieved
through a down-regulation of precision, and what we are talking about here is offline
cognition. The natural thing to say, one might argue, is that one subspecies of such
offline cognition is imaginative experience. Other subspecies might include, for
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example, dreaming (Hobson and Friston, 2012), mind-wandering (Metzinger, 2018),
hallucination (Wilkinson, 2014), or inner speech (Wilkinson and Fernyhough, 2017).
Some might construe these as forms of imagination, or as involving imagination,
others not.3 In what follows we will focus on a more restricted notion of deliberate
imagination as a distinct form of offline cognition.4
This overall approach views imagination proper, not so much as an all-pervasive
building block of experience, but as a particular subspecies of offline cognition, that,
yes, has a lot in commonwith, say, perception, but is to be sharply distinguished from
it in a number of ways. The main challenge for accounts of imagination then
becomes what the precise nature of that distinction is.
But even what perception and imagination have in common is qualitatively differ-
ent, and this reflects a real virtue of the PPF in explaining a feature of imagination (and
related mental episodes). Because the hypothesis-building in the imaginative
(decoupled) instance is not driven by an attempt to minimize incoming prediction
error, it is not hypothesis-building at the very bottom of the hierarchy (namely, at or
near the organism’s sensory surfaces), and hence the corresponding experience has
certain phenomenological features. For example, in imagining a blue car, you might
not imagine necessarily, as you do in perception, that particular shade of blue. In the
broadest terms, imaginative experience tends to be less vivid and determinate, and
more abstract, and the PPF has a convincing explanation of these differences.5
Departing from Reality Without Surprise
An immediate apparent worry arises for the PPF account of imagination. According
to the PPF, our experiential content arises from the interaction between top-down
predictions and error signals from our sensory contact with reality. One of the most
obvious problems for accommodating imagination within the PPF is that the purpose
of imagination is, in most cases, to envisage a departure from reality. This raises the
worry of how we are able to maintain imagined content despite its conflict with the
incoming sensory signal. One would expect predictions of content that departs from
reality to generate significant error signals and thus be quickly extinguished as the
relevant error signals propagate through the hierarchy. After all, the predictive
hierarchy works to minimize overall surprise and imaginative departures from reality
are often, in the technical sense, surprising. Thus, the question arises as to how
imaginative content can be maintained despite conflicting with our sensory input. If
our minds are made to model and track reality, how do we accomplish the sustained
suspension of disbelief? It is hard to explain how we can foster a state of what Keats
called “negative capability . . . when man is capable of being in uncertainties,
mysteries, doubts, without an irritable reaching after fact” (Keats, 1958: 193–194).
3 For example, Wilkinson and Fernyhough (2017) have argued that it is misleading to think of inner
speech as involving imagination.
4 We will henceforth refer to this simply as “imagination,” but this does not indicate that we see this as
the only mental process worthy of the name.
5 Imagination doesn’t have to be less vivid or determinate than perception, as we can conceive of super-
imaginers who can imagine with perceptual vivacity. However, this would be an exceptional case.
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This worry can potentially be assuaged by taking account of the role of
precision-weighting according to the PPF. Earlier we saw how turning down
the precision on incoming error signals was central to explaining action in PPF.
However, it may also play a central role in explaining how we are able to
maintain imaginative content that is mismatched with the immediate environ-
ment. When we are engaged in an imaginative exercise, we should expect there
to be a large discrepancy between the imagined content being predicted by
higher levels in the hierarchy and incoming sensory signals. As such, we expect
the incoming sensory signals to be extremely imprecise with respect to our
departure from reality. Therefore, by assigning a low precision-weighting to
error-signals coming from the sensory periphery, the errors can be down-
modulated to the extent that they do not perturb the imagined content. Just as
in action control, where precision-weighting allows one to maintain content of
an action that has not yet happened in order to bring that action about, in the
case of imagination, precision-weighting allows one to maintain content pertain-
ing to circumstances that are not (yet) occurring in one’s immediate environment
and that may never actually occur.
However, while this explains how imagination can be maintained, it does not
explain how it can be constrained. Our imaginative episodes tend to be relatively
coherent, so one would expect there to be something playing the error-correcting role
of inputs from the external world and thereby constraining the development of
imaginative activity.
Imaginative Agency and Imaginative Constraints
An upshot of this appeal to precision-weighting is that imagination is just
like perception but without being constrained by incoming sensory input.
However, this immediately gives rise to the question of what, if anything, con-
strains imagination. The deliberate act of imagining can be distinguished from
dreaming, hallucination, and mind-wandering by the fact that it is a product of our
personal-level agency. Imagination is often voluntary and goal-directed, and must
therefore be constrained.
Imaginative Agency
Imagining is something we often do voluntarily, usually to serve a particular pur-
pose. One way of appreciating this phenomenon is to carefully contrast imagination
with imagery. In contrast to imagery, imagination is a personal-level phenomenon:
People are engaged in acts of imagination, people imagine things, and, although they
do all manner of things that involve imagery, they don’t do imagery, or engage in
imagery tout court. Acts of imagination enable people to appreciate, in potentially
many different ways, non-actual scenarios, and, when they are engaged in such acts,
they may be motivated to do so by a number of different things. These acts of
imagination will often recruit or make use of imagery in many modalities, but there
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will also be aspects to the imaginative experience that aren’t imagistic (Langland-
Hassan, 2015; Yablo, 1993).6
Imagination is often within the control of our intentions; it is something that we do
for a reason (Langland-Hassan, 2016). We use our imagination to serve a variety of
different purposes. We may be trying to remember the color of someone’s hair, judge
whether we could jump over a stream, reason about a social situation, or simply
entertain fantastical scenarios for the pleasure of it. The potential aims of imagina-
tion include (but are not limited to) (1) knowledge-acquisition, (2) creativity, and (3)
comprehension of others’ creative outputs. In short, imagination is goal-directed.
Imaginative Constraints
Understanding imagination as a goal-directed activity immediately gives rise to
issues regarding how we are able to keep the imagination under control so that it
reaches its goals. If imagination were just the free association of ideas, then it’s hard
to see how we could ever plot a stable course to the goal that we are aiming for.
Imagination must be constrained in some way so that we can pursue a given goal.
However, all of the goals that we put imagination to require that it is in some sense
generative. To serve any useful purpose it must give us more than we already started
with. Thus, in order for imagination to serve its purpose, it cannot be too constrained
by our intentions. If we could only imagine exactly what we intend to imagine, then
imagination couldn’t give us any new content (Langland-Hassan, 2016). To explain
the balance between the goal-directed and generative nature of imagination, the PPF
needs to explain how imagination is constrained to just the right extent.
This is particularly pertinent when one focuses on cases in which the imagination
is used to generate knowledge. The imagination often seems unbounded and without
constraint. However, if this were the case then it would be more likely to generate
falsehoods than truths. Imagination must be constrained in order to provide knowl-
edge (Balcerak Jackson, 2018; Kind, 2016; Williamson, 2016). On the other hand, if
we want to generate any new knowledge, what we imagine cannot be entirely “up to
us,” as it must go beyond what we already know (Balcerak Jackson, 2016, 2018;
Langland-Hassan, 2016). The knowledge-generating capacity of the imagination can
be explained by suggesting that some constraints on the imagination are fixed and
within our control, allowing for exploratory activity within these constraints. For
example, if one wants to know whether a sofa will fit through a door, one must
constrain one’s imagination to keep the relevant shapes and sizes and the laws of
physics fixed, while allowing for exploration of various possible ways of manipulat-
ing the sofa. Van Leeuwen refers to this kind of imaginative process as “exploratory
constraint satisfaction” (van Leeuwen, 2013: 229).
Imagination does not only serve to provide us with knowledge, it also plays
a central role in creative activity, for example in the development of art and fiction
for others’ consumption. As with the case of knowledge-directed imagination,
6 It should be noted that some take imagination to be inherently imagistic (Kind, 2001); however, this
does not preclude a distinction between imagination and imagery, as there can be imagery that is not the
product of imagination.
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creative imagination must be constrained. The structures, situations, or narratives
that play out in our minds are not wild free-associations of concepts, they are
coherent, in some sense that is akin to the coherence of perceptual experience, albeit
with room for departures from reality. Again, the notion of imaginative exploration
within chosen constraints seems apt to capture this activity. Creative imaginers
explore what is possible within well-defined constraints that behave in accordance
with certain (natural or narrative) expectations.
A further role for imagination lies in our ability to engage with others’ creative
outputs. When we engage with a fiction, our imaginative episodes are, again,
constrained in various ways. First, our imaginative episodes tend to try to conform
to our beliefs about reality as much as possible (Weisberg and Goodstein, 2009),
although not necessarily the immediately experienced environment. Second, imagi-
native engagement with fiction is constrained by expectations determined by genre-
specific narrative conventions (van Leeuwen, 2013).
Where are the Constraints in PPF?
The problem for the PPF account of imagination lies in explaining where the
voluntary constraints on imagination come from. How can the imagination be
constrained to achieve its goals without being kept in check by the outside world,
when, according to the PPF, the constraints on perceptual inference come from error
signals from the world? Both perception and action are dynamic processes, with
experiential content unfolding over time in a relatively coherent manner. In the case
of the former, this coherence can be explained by the fact that the content is
constantly being entrained to reality by an incoming error signal. However, in the
case of imagination, where the precise aim is a departure from reality, there is no
error signal coming from amerely possible world to keep the content in check. In line
with this concern, even Clark admits that “it seems very likely that for most creatures
acts of deliberate imagining . . . are simply impossible” (Clark, 2016: 94). Yet acts of
deliberate imagining are precisely the target explanandum.
This problem is not limited to accounts of the imagination. It is equally problematic
in accounting for any departure from one’s immediate reality. The PPF should be able
to account for how we are able to accurately remember the past despite the sensory
signals having long departed, and howwe are able to predict and plan for distant future
events taking place in environments different than those from which one’s current
sensory stimulation is coming.7 In these cases, as with imagination, the question arises
as to where the relevant error signals for constraining one’s departure from immediate
reality come from.
The PPF can arguably explain these capacities for “mental time travel” in terms of
dampening the error signals from sensory inputs by lowering the expected sensory
precision, so that error signals from within the generative hierarchy, rather than the
sensory periphery, play the primary role in constraining content (see Clark, 2016:
7 There is some evidence to suggest that memory, planning, and imagination may have more in common
than is often assumed, suggesting that all of these processes that call for departures from reality may be
mediated by the same underlying mechanisms (De Brigard, 2014, 2017).
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102–108). In this way, content can be constrained by past occurrences, since the
hierarchy has been shaped by experiences, and more distant future predictions can be
kept in check by the inbuilt assumption that the future will resemble the past that has
sculpted the hierarchy.
Returning to the case of imagination, for situations that are similar to those that we
have encountered in the past, imagination may similarly be constrained by error
signals from within the hierarchy in the same manner as in cases of memory or
longer-term prediction. Intra-hierarchical error signals may explain our ability to
imagine scenarios that are closely related to our immediate situation or those that
closely mirror our own past experiences. Imagination is thus likely to work in
a similar fashion to memory or planning when the goals of imagination are closely
aligned with those of these other activities. However, it seems unable to account for
our ability to purposefully engage with imaginative content that drastically departs
from reality, either for gaining knowledge of more distant possibilities or for enga-
ging in more fantastical creative or recreational imaginative episodes.
Imagination as Mental Action
So far, we have considered accounts that conceive of imaginative experi-
ences as grounded in sensory hypotheses. Although this speaks to the sensory
phenomenology present in much (although arguably not all) imagining, it generates
problems with accounting for how these hypotheses can be purposeful and con-
strained. However, an alternative way of understanding imagination within the PPF
is in terms not so much of perception as of action.
Active Inference and Mental Action
Imagination, in this view, emerges as predicted consequences of anticipated possible
actions. In order to explain how actions are selected from a range of options,
proponents of the PPF arguably need to include counterfactual representations
(Burr and Jones, 2016; Friston et al., 2012; Seth, 2014), i.e. predictions of what the
sensory consequences would be if one were to engage in a particular action. For
example, in order to decide whether to look left or right, one must predict the likely
sensory consequences of each option. Since many actions will be mutually exclusive,
many such representations will inevitably be about merely fictional circumstances,
representing possible sensory consequences of actions that never occur. The fact that
action may already require representing non-actual states may provide a clue as to
the basis of imagination, for which representation of merely possible or non-actual
states is central (Pezzulo, 2011; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009). Imagination may
emerge from active inference with “suppression of overt sensory and motor pro-
cesses” (Pezzulo, 2012: 1; see also Pezzulo, 2017).
This reliance on action may seem like a perplexing move, since action is usually
contrasted with sensory, perception-like events. Thus, at this point, it is vital to
distinguish between two different senses of “action.” In one sense (most commonly
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used in the cognitive sciences), “action” simply means motor activity, the endogen-
ous bringing about of bodily movement. But this is neither sufficient, nor is it
necessary, for “action” in the second sense (most commonly used in philosophy),
which is tied not so much to the motoric, but to the agentive. Roughly, something is
an action if it is intentional (or, to be more precise, has a description under which it is
intentional). If you deliberately imagine a red triangle (maybe you’ve been offered
a large sum of money to do so), that counts as an action in the agentive sense, but not
(at least not obviously) in the motoric sense.8
What is the relationship between these two senses of “action” within the PPF? We
said in the section “From Perception to Action” (above) that motor activity is under-
stood within the PPF in terms of active inference (where this is contrasted with
perceptual inference). In active inference, the world (in this case the body) is brought
in line with predictions (in this case proprioceptive predictions), instead of the other
way around, as it is with perceptual inference. However, if precision is turned down,
the prediction doesn’t have to be fulfilled, the bodilymovement doesn’t ensue, and you
end up with motor imagination or rehearsal. But although active inference is usually
thought of in the context of explaining motor activity via proprioceptive predictions,
there is nothing special or different about proprioception, and the same can apply to the
sensory domain. In other words, the organism can generate sensory predictions that
also don’t need to be fulfilled, and the result here would be sensory imagination.
Note that, although this looks like a view of imagination as merely decoupled
perception, it is grounded in active inference, not in perceptual inference. In relying
on active inference, these events, both proprioceptive and sensory, have to be potential
events. More specifically, they are decoupled versions of potential actions (in the
philosophical sense), both practical and epistemic. And this provides constraints that
you wouldn’t get from freewheeling perceptual inference: Proprioceptive and sensory
imagination in this view is constrained by potential bodily actions, by potential acts of
listening and looking. Note that, in being active, visual imagination is best thought of
as decoupled looking, rather than seeing; and auditory imagination is best thought of as
decoupled listening, rather than hearing.We do not get our attention passively grabbed
by what we imagine (as we do with a worldly event like a bang or a flash). We bring it
actively (and often effortfully) into being. It is driven by our agency.
This core idea, that imagination involves possible actions and experiences, gen-
erates constraints that come from two main sources. The first is bodily constraints
that are the result of the organism’s phenotype. The second is constraints from past
experience. Some of the ways in which actions affect sensory input are relatively
stable, both throughout one’s lifetime and over recent evolutionary history, since
they are determined by the shape of one’s body. These stable relationships between
action and sensation are known as sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan and Noë,
2001; Seth, 2014). Given this stability, they are likely also to be stable features of
one’s predictive model of the world (Burr and Jones, 2016). As a result, when one
8 That is why the latter is not always necessary for the former, and indeed, there is a great deal of action
(motor activity) that is not action (intentional/agentive).
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engages in merely imagined action, the content of one’s imagination will be con-
strained by the sensorimotor contingencies for the kind of body that one possesses.
However, some constraints on the predicted sensory consequences of action
derive from stable structure in the world rather than one’s own body. For example,
by engaging in the action of eating an apple on several occasions, we may come to
associate this action with a certain gustatory consequence: the taste of an apple.
These kinds of stable relationships can also be modeled by the predictive hierarchy,
allowing the predicted consequences of actions to be constrained by the way the
world is. As a result, the merely simulated action involved in imagination can also be
suitably constrained by past experience.
Distant Fantasies and the Role of Language
The active-inference-based account improves upon the purely perceptual-inference-
based account of imagination by accommodating the purposive nature of imagina-
tion, as well as the idea that imagination can be constrained. By deliberately
simulating actions that never actually take place we can generate content that departs
from our immediate circumstances, yet which is constrained by the brain’s model of
how actions impact on sensation.
However, one concern goes, in doing so, does this not still tie imagination too
closely to the real world? The active-inference-based accounts can explain how we
are able to simulate the kinds of actions that we tend to engage in with the kinds of
bodies that we possess and the kinds of lives we have led, and this may account for
a wide range of the kinds of imaginative activity that we engage with in everyday
circumstances. However, even a cursory reflection on the phenomenology of imagi-
nation suggests that not all of our imaginative episodes are quite this mundane.
Thus far, neither a perceptual-inference-based nor an active-inference-based PPF
account seems apt to explain the full range of our imaginative competences. Neither
approach seems able to walk the tightrope between imagination being entirely
unconstrained and freewheeling, on the one hand, and too closely tied to reality, on
the other. A potential solution may lie in exploring the role that language plays in
structuring our imaginative episodes.
Although Clark is skeptical about the possibility of deliberate imagination in most
creatures, he takes deliberate imagination to be possible in humans as a result of “the
use of self-cueing via language” (Clark, 2016: 94). In many cases, our ability to
generate imaginative episodes is closely tied to our consumption and production of
narrative. Perhaps language helps to steer attention when we engage in offline
imagination, much as it can do in our online interactions with the world (Lupyan,
2012; Lupyan and Clark, 2015).
As humans, we develop in a linguistically saturated environment. Language
serves as more than just a medium for communicating thought; it is also central to
the development of our cognitive capacities and to shaping and steering our thoughts
(Clark, 2006). The hierarchical generative model that we build up through our
interactions with the environment models more than just the natural causal structure
of the world around us: It is also likely to encompass associations between words and
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their contents. Simply hearing, reading, or merely entertaining a word or sentence
about a particular content is likely to impact the predictions regarding perceiving or
acting on instances of that content. Words create “artificial contexts” in which one is
biased toward expecting to perceptually encounter their content (Lupyan and Clark,
2015: 282–283). For example, merely hearing the word that corresponds to
a stimulus that would otherwise remain invisible to subjects can boost the stimulus
into visual awareness (Lupyan and Ward, 2013).
In more mundane imaginative exercises, such as imagining whether a sofa will fit
through the door, we tend not to engage in drastic fantastical departures from reality, and
that is a very good thing. It wouldn’t help if one suddenly imagined the sofa turning into
a hippopotamus. Notice, however, that as you read the previous sentence, it was hard not
to imagine the aforementioned fantastical transformation, despite it being far from our
usual bodily interactions with the world. This suggests that the interaction between
language and imagination may provide a route for the PPF proponent to account for our
ability to imagine more distant fantasies. Linguistic cues may bias our offline simula-
tions in a similar way to how they bias perception, bringing particular content to
awareness. Furthermore, the compositional and thus productive nature of language
may explain how we are able to combine contents in imagination of which we have
no experience and that we are vanishingly unlikely ever to experience.
The idea that language has a significant role to play in a PPF account of imagination
seems promising. However, much more work needs to be done to fully flesh out this
idea. At first sight, the proposal seems to suffer from a “chicken-and-egg” problem. We
tend to see narrative linguistic expression as the product of creative imaginative
endeavors, so it is hard to see how language could be both the product of the process
and the precursor that needs to already be in place to guide and constrain it. Moreover,
the precise details of how complex linguistic abilities are realized according to PPF and
how such abilities impact on othermental processeswithin the PPF remain to beworked
out in detail. Thus, exploring the way in which language engenders the capacity for
drastic imaginative departures from reality is a fruitful line for further research.
Concluding Remarks
On the one hand, PPF has the potential to demystify the imagination, as it
frames the imagination as much more similar and closely tied to perception and/or
action. On the other hand, a PPF account of the imagination faces problems of its
own. In particular, as things stand, PPF must do more to account for how the
imagination can be both suitably constrained and sufficiently generative without
the relevant constraints being imposed by the world. How can our predictions be
constrained by mere fictions and fantasies, when the main task of the brain is to
predict reality rather than departures from it?9 If the PPF can overcome these issues,
9 Answering this question could also provide insight into cases in which the mind is detrimentally
constrained by fiction and fantasy in atypical contexts (e.g. delusions and hallucinations in schizo-
phrenia). In particular, it might be that imaginative episodes in these contexts are, for whatever reason,
not recognized as such by the subject.
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perhaps by appealing to the role of language, and provide an account of the
imagination, then it can come one step closer to fulfilling its promise of providing
a grand, unified approach to the mind.
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